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Bank affiliated directors and earnings management: Evidence from India 
 
Abstract  
 
We examine the governing impact of creditors, i.e. Bank Appointed Directors (BAD), on the 
earnings management of corporate firms in a context which is characterized by underdeveloped 
financial institutions, a weak legal (contract) enforcement system and lack of insolvency 
resolution framework, i.e. India.  Unlike the US, where BADs play a limited monitoring role, 
BADs in India play an active role in firm monitoring and thus have a negative impact on the 
discretionary accruals. Further, we document that the impact is greater for firms with a greater 
degree of information asymmetry and the agency problem. These results remain robust even after 
controlling for potential endogeneity issue. 
 
Introduction 
Accounting activities of the firm are affected by the governance of the investors as accounting 
information affect the decision making of the investors, therefore, affecting their interests. 
Investors, both equity holders and creditors, employ various governance structure and 
mechanisms to safeguard their interests (Xie et al., 2003; Kim and Yi, 2006; Hashim and Devi, 
2008; Jaggi et al., 2009; Ferreira et al., 2009). Prior studies in this area suggest that the 
effectiveness of such governance is affected by the institutional, regulatory and legal framework 
of firms working (La Porta et al., 2000; Rajan, 1992).  There are many studies which the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms employed by the shareholders and the 
accounting activities, especially earnings management in various institutional contexts (Sarkar et 
al., 2008; García‐Meca, and Sánchez‐Ballesta, 2009; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2014). 
However, we have not come across any study which examine the impact of creditors’ 
governance on the accounting activities, except Earkens et al. (2014). They examine the impact 
of Bank Appointed Directors (BAD) on the accounting conservatism of the US firms and show 
that firms with BAD on their board use less conservative accounting. This result has to be seen in 
the overall institutional context of the US, which is characterized by well-developed financial 
institutions, efficient legal system and a robust insolvency resolution framework. The creditor’s 
incentives and ability to govern the accounting activities of the managers should be affected by 
these aspects. For example, creditors will have less incentives to govern firm activities if the 
legal system which enforces debt contracts, in case of violations, is very efficient. Also, they will 
have less incentives to monitor firm activities if legal provisions like lenders liability exist. In 
line with this argument, Kroszner and Strahan (2001) and Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) find BADs 
acting as disabled monitors on the boards of US firms. These results can’t be generalized to a 
situation where the enforcement of legal contracts is very weak and provisions like lenders’ 
liability do not exist (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Dittmann et al., 2010; Allen et al., 2012). 
Under such circumstances, creditors, i.e. BADs, would monitor accounting activities more 
actively and this should result in less earnings management
1
.  We test this hypothesis using the 
Indian data as it provides a totally different ecosystem. As it will be discussed in the next section, 
Indian ecosystem is characterized by underdeveloped financial institutions, a common law based 
legal system with a very weak contract enforcement arm and no unified insolvency resolution 
framework. These characteristics should impact the monitoring effectiveness of BADs. Given 
these differences, unlike the US, we expect BADs to actively monitor the activities of the firms. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that firms with BAD on board have a lesser earning management
2
. 
We use discretionary accruals (DA) as a proxy to measure EM, which is widely used in the 
literature (Teoh et al. 1998, Dechow et al. 2010, Chen et al. 2007, Cohen and Zarowin 2010). We 
use three approaches to examine the impact of BAD on the earning management of Indian firms. 
In the first approach, we examine this issue in a cross section of firms using a dummy variable, 
representing the presence of BAD. This essentially compares the average DA of BAD firms with 
that of non-BAD firms. Our results show that the average DA of non-BAD firms is about 1.5% 
higher than BAD firms in terms of total assets. This value is big considering the average DA of 
BAD firms which is about 6.7%. Economically, it amounts to 22.5% higher discretionary 
accruals for non-BAD firms as compared to that of BAD firms. In the second approach, we test 
our hypothesis by comparing the average DA in periods before appointment of BAD (Pre-BAD 
period) and after appointment of BAD (BAD period). We find a significant decrease in the levels 
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 It also means that firms would employ more conservative accounting. Conservative accounting and earnings 
management are negatively associated (Chen et al., 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2018) 
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 DeGeorge et al. (1999) defined “Earnings management (EM) as the strategic exercise of managerial discretion in 
influencing the earnings figure reported to external audience. It is accomplished principally by timing reported or 
actual economic events to shift income between periods.” 
of DA in the BAD period as compared to that of Pre- BAD period, which support the findings of 
our earlier approach. In the last approach, we examine the level of DA with respect to their 
industry average in both the Pre-BAD and BAD periods. We observe that, the average industry 
adjusted DA was positive for our sample firms in the Pre-BAD period, implying a greater DA as 
compared to the industry average. This positive value turned negative in the BAD period, 
implying that firms now have a DA level which is lower than the industry average. This change 
from above industry level to below industry level provides further support to our hypothesis of a 
negative impact of BAD on DA.  The results from all the three approaches firmly establish a 
negative association between BAD and discretionary accruals. 
 
Both the managers’ incentives to manage their earnings and BADs incentives to monitor such 
attempts is conditioned by the degree of information asymmetry and the agency problem of free 
cash flows (Richardson, 2000; Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2014 ). 
Moreover, as we discuss in the next section, in India, the ownership structure could also play an 
important role in the earnings management of the firms. Indian firms have a highly concentrated 
ownership structure with promoters holding on average 40% of the shareholdings 
(Narayanaswamy et al., 2012). Such a higher concentration of promoter ownership, in the form 
of pyramidal structure, results tunneling of profits among business group affiliated firms. This 
has direct implication for earnings management as tunneling of profit necessitates management 
of earnings. As rational investors, BADs expect this tendency a priory and be more careful with 
group firms. The testable hypothesis is that the negative impact of BAD is greater for group 
affiliated firms. Our results provide supporting evidences to the information asymmetry and the 
free cash flow hypothesis, however, for the ownership structure hypothesis there is no positive 
evidence.  
 
Theoretically, it is possible that banks may choose to appoint their members as directors only on 
the boards of such firms in which earnings are actively managed. We show in the following 
sections that our sample firms with at least one bank director, had a significantly higher level of 
DA as compared to that of their industry averages prior to the appointment of such BADs. This 
suggests that endogenity may be a concern in our study. In order to account for this, we use the 
instrumental variables with two stage least square estimator ( IV-2SLS) approach. The decision 
to appoint a director on the board is taken ex ante by looking into the current situation of 
earnings management and the amount of loan that is to be sanctioned. Therefore, we use lagged 
values of DA and the contemporaneous ratio of bank debt in terms of total assets as the 
instrumental variables. The lag values of DA may not influence current DA as it is determined 
by the current status of the governance. The tests of relevancy (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
and validity (Hansen J statistic) confirm our choice of instruments. Even in this analysis, our 
findings do not change, therefore, our results remain robust even after taking into account the 
possible endogeneity issue.  
 
The focus of our study is closely related to Earkens et al. (2014) who examine the impact of the 
presence of BAD on the board of US firms on the accounting conservatism. Their basic 
hypothesis is that BAD provide a more robust monitoring mechanism than debt contract 
facilitated accounting conservatism, therefore, the presence of BAD on corporate board 
decreases the need for conservative accounting. While it is true that BAD provide a more robust 
monitoring mechanism, the need for debt contract facilitated accounting, which reduces the 
degree of earnings management, is still important in the Indian context. This is because, their 
basic substitution argument may not hold true in the Indian context. It is our argument that, this 
substitutability could be true in only those systems where, there is an efficient legal system, 
which enforces the debt contacts in case of violations, and there is an efficient system for the 
resolution of bankruptcies. However, when the legal system is weak and no efficient system 
exists for the resolution of the bankruptcies, then BADs act as a mechanism to oversee the 
enforcement of the contract itself. Therefore, establishing a positive association between BAD 
and accounting conservatism. In the robustness section, we show that BADs indeed have a 
positive impact on the conservative accounting of Indian firms. This results contradicts the result 
of Earkens et al. (2014) and supports our basic argument that in the Indian context, BADs 
oversee the enforcement of conservative accounting.  
 
Our study makes contribution to two streams of the finance literature. The first stream examines 
the role of BAD in corporate firms. Our study contributes to this steam by showing that BAD 
would act as an effective governing mechanism, i.e. enabled monitors in an emerging world 
context. This result contradicts the disabled monitor role that they play in the US context and we 
attribute this difference in the role to the differences in the institutional framework. The second 
stream examines the impact of corporate governance on the earnings management of firms. In 
this stream, hitherto, such a question has been addressed from the shareholders point of view. We 
are the first ones to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms available for debt 
holders on the earnings management of the firms using the discretionary accruals approach. 
Also, our study is related to the stream of the literature which examines how legal and financial 
institutions affect the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanism by showing that the 
institutional hypothesis is equally applicable to the governance of creditors.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we discuss briefly the 
institutional framework of our study and theoretical aspects and hypotheses are discussed in the 
third section. In the fourth section, data and methodology used to test our hypotheses are 
discussed. The results are presented and discussed in the fifth section and the robustness of the 
results for the endogeneity issue is checked in the sixth section. Finally, the conclusions are 
drawn in the seventh section. 
 
2 Institutional framework 
In this section, we discuss some of the important institutional features of the Indian financial, 
legal and corporate system. To conserve space and for brevity, we discuss only such issues 
which have a direct bearing on our study.  For additional information, readers may refer 
Chakrabarti et al. (2008), Allen et al. (2012) and Narayansaswamy et al. (2012) who provide an 
excellent discussion on the legal, regulatory and institutional aspects of the Indian financial 
system.  
2.1 Indian financial system 
India has an underdeveloped financial system. Both banking as well as stock markets are less 
developed as compared to that of US
3
 and also other emerging nations (Chakrabarti et al., 2008; 
Allen et al., 2012).  Allen et al. (2012) report that bank credit to corporate firms is about 37% of 
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 Allen et al. (2012) mentions that India’s stock market capitalization to GDP ratio is about 64% which a way lesser 
than the world average, which is 101% 
the GDP which is a way lesser than for other emerging nations (65%)
4
. Also, the non-performing 
assets (NPA), which indicate the efficiency of the banking sector, is very high at about 7%. With 
respect to stock markets, the market capitalization of Indian stocks is far less at about 64% of the 
GDP as compared to that of world average, which is 101%
5
. The recent trend in the Indian 
financial system is that, stock markets are becoming more dominant. Up to late 1990s, the 
banking sector dominated the financial system, however, lately stock markets have become more 
prominent both in size and activity (Allen et al., 2012; Jadiyappa et al., 2016). Another important 
aspect of the Indian financial system is that as Jadiyappa et al. (2016) observe, corporate bond 
market, for all practical purpose, does not exist for the Indian corporate firms. Looking into all 
these aspects of the Indian financial system, Allen et al. (2012) argue that the Indian financial 
system plays a very limited role in the allocation of resources.  This underdevelopment of the 
financial system has some important implications for our study. First, the underdevelopment 
affects the ability of the stock and banking sector in collection, processing, disseminating and 
using the information for corporate control. The resulting higher degrees of information 
asymmetry between the corporate firms and financial act as an incentive for BADs to monitor 
firm activities, wherever they are present. Second, because of the underdevelopment of the 
corporate bond markets, another mechanism available for the creditors, i.e. activist bondholders, 
to safeguard the interest of the creditors is not existent (Narayanaswamy et al., 2012). In absence 
of such a mechanism, the BADs assume even more importance in safeguarding the interests of 
the creditors. 
2.2 Indian legal system 
India has a history of common law based legal system. It provides highest amount of protection 
to both shareholders and creditors. However, after evaluating the enforcement aspect, 
Chakrabarti et al. (2008) and  Allen et al. (2012) conclude that  there is a difference between 
protection de jure and protection de facto. In their words,  
“while on paper, the country’s legal system provides some of the best investor protection in the 
world, enforcement is a major problem with slow, over-burdened courts and significant 
corruption” 
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 For the period 2001-2007 
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 Allen et al. (2012) 
Two aspects of this inefficient legal system could have a greater impact on the efficiency of the 
BAD. First, contract enforcement and second bankruptcy/insolvency resolution.  
Enforcement of contracts through the regular court system is a major problem in India. World 
Bank report on Doing Business reports that time to enforce contracts ranges between 7 to 10.8 
years
6
, with a recovery rate of 15.9 to 9.1 and cost (in terms of % of estate) of 7 to 10%. 
Therefore, the report places India at the 177
th
 among 178 countries in enforcement of contracts. 
The debt contract, being a civil contract, has to go through the same system if there are any 
violations. Therefore, for Indian creditors, the option to enforce their debt contracts in the cases 
of violations is a very lengthy and time consuming process. This makes BADs as a more potent 
mechanism to oversee the activities of the managers and to safeguard their interest. With respect 
to bankruptcy resolution, Kang and Nayar (2004) report that there is no single comprehensive 
and integrated policy on corporate bankruptcy in India along the lines of Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 
of the US bankruptcy code. Various institutions, such as debt recovery tribunals, company law 
boards, board for industrial and financial reconstruction and finally the high courts, have 
simultaneous jurisdiction over insolvency resolution making the process very long and costly. 
Considering this overlapping, Chakrabarti et al. (2008) report that on average, Indian system 
takes about 10 years, which is the longest in the world, to process the insolvency resolution and 
further, they state that due to such inordinate delays, the recovery rates have been very low, 
about 12%
7
. These aspects make bankruptcy resolution through formal system may not be a 
suitable solution, if bankruptcy did take place.  
Kroszner and Strahan (2001) argue that main hurdle for BADs to act as enabled monitors in the 
US context is the presence of the legal provision lenders liability. This provision prevent BADs 
from playing an active role in the management of the firms as the costs of such active 
management, in the event of bankruptcy, are huge. Indian BADs are not constrained by any such 
legal provision. Therefore, they can act freely without any hindrance.  
In the presence such weak contract enforcement and bankruptcy systems and the absence of 
lenders liability provision, bank representatives on the boards have a greater incentives to 
monitor firm activities which should impact the earnings management attempts of the managers.  
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 This varies between city to city with Hyderabad taking the top rank and Kolkata taking the last rank. The world 
bank Doing business report, 2008 
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 The world average is about 27% 
2.3 Ownership structure: Corporate governance perspective 
Unlike US, where stock ownership is widely dispersed, the firms in India have a substantial 
stock ownership by the founding families. The mean founding family ownership is about 40% in 
BSE 500 stocks in 2010 (Narayanaswamy et al., 2012). This concentrated ownership, structured 
in a pyramid shape, allows separation of control rights from that of cash flow rights. Such a 
structure permits the promoters to extract rent from that of minority shareholders, bearing only a 
small fraction of the cost (Claessens et al., 2000). Chakrabarti et al. (2008) conclude that such 
rent extraction, through tunneling, is helped by “copious reporting” which in turn give more 
scope for earnings management. Under this context of rent extraction by the promoter, 
Narayanaswamy et al., (2012) argue that governance mechanisms developed in the western 
economies (Anglo-American), may not be well suited to address the agency conflicts that are 
observed in the Indian context.  
Therefore, the monitoring role of the BADs has to been examined in this context of less 
development of the financial institutions, lengthy contract enforcement and weak bankruptcy 
resolution system and promoters incentives to extract private rent from the minority 
shareholders. These specific environmental factors make BADs perform the role of enabled 
monitor in the Indian context.  
 
3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
Kroszner and Strahan (2001) suggests that BADs could possibly perform three different roles in 
the management of the firms. The role they actually play in a given firm depends on many 
internal and external factors such information asymmetry, financial distress and legal provisions. 
The first role is the “enable monitors”. In this case, BADs would actively monitor the decisions 
of the managers, especially investment decisions, in order to safeguard their interest in the 
presence of shareholders creditors conflicts (Erkens et al., 2014).Theoretically this role should be 
more pronounced in those firms which are exposed to more information asymmetry and financial 
distress (Byrd and Mizruchi 2005,  Dittmann et al. 2010). The second role is the “disabled 
monitors” in this case, they act as passive monitors and the last role is that they act as experts on 
financial markets and institutions. However, the incentives to play a particular role is constrained 
by the existence of shareholders favoring legal provisions like, lenders liability in the US. Under 
such provision, Kroszner and Strahan (2001)   argue that the costs of active monitoring is greater 
than the benefit they receive, therefore, they choose not to actively monitor firms, especially 
distressed and informational asymmetric firms, i.e. they become disabled monitors.  
India provides altogether a different legal and financial environmental setting to examine the 
monitoring role of BAD. Underdevelopment of the financial institutions with weak legal 
enforcement system and concentrated ownership of promoters provide a better setting for the 
managers to indulge in earnings management. Therefore, under this context, it is our argument 
that BAD would perform the role of enabled monitors. In this regard, i.e. effective earnings 
supervision, BADs have an advantage over other board members in three aspects. First, as senior 
bank officials
8
 they are more qualified to see through the accounting information that managers 
provide to the board than the other board members. Second, they have access to the checking 
accounts of the firms, which reveal the actual information about firm activities (Rajan 1992, 
Datta et al. 2005). This provides them access to information which is superior to the information 
provided in the financial statements (Earkens et al., 2014). And lastly as Kroszner and Strahan 
(2001) observe, banks over time become specialized in lending to a particular sector, thereby 
accumulating vast amount of knowledge, insights and experience of that sector which can be 
useful in detecting any manipulations. Therefore, BAD are expected to be more efficient in 
detecting earnings management than other members of the board. Thus, the firms with BAD on 
their board should have a lesser level of earnings management. 
H1: Firms with BAD should have a lower discretionary accruals as compared to that of firms 
with no BAD 
 
Both the ability of the mangers to indulge in earnings management and the incentives of BADs 
to monitor the activities of the managers depends on the information asymmetry aspect of the 
firms (Richardson, 2000; Dittmann et al., 2010). Managers ability increases when the firm is 
characterized by higher levels of information asymmetry as less amount of information shields 
him from external scrutiny. Therefore, firms which are exposed to a greater level of information 
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 Most of the BAD are senior banking officials with  a very long banking expertise. We consider only the board 
members who are appointed by the lender banks in our analysis 
asymmetry have greater levels of discretionary accruals (Richardson 2000, Siregar and Utama 
2008, Prior et al. 2008, Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca 2014 ). From BADs perspective also, the 
incentives to monitor actively is greater in those firms which are having a higher degree of 
information asymmetry (Byrd and Mizruchi 2005). From this it follows that, BADs are expected 
to decrease earnings management in all the firms in which they are the board members, however, 
the magnitude of their impact should be greater in informationally asymmetric firms.  We use 
firm size as a proxy for information asymmetry (Byrd and Mizruchi 2005). Large firms are 
usually scrutinized by investors, regulators (Siregar and Utama 2008) and analysts (Gonzalez 
and Garcia-Meca 2014) and thus are expected to have a lesser degree of information asymmetry. 
Moreover, as Lee and Choi (2002) argue, small firms are efficient in keeping private information 
to themselves than that of large firms and as Bhattacharya (2001) argue extracting such private 
information costs more in small firms as compared to that of large firms. All these arguments 
suggest that small firms are exposed to more information asymmetry as compared to that of large 
firms. Therefore, we expect that the negative impact of BAD on DA should be greater for 
smaller firms. 
H2: The negative association between BAD and DA is greater for small firms 
 
Jensen (1986) argue that the firms with higher amounts of free cash flows  suffer more from the 
agency problem compared to that of firms with low free cash flows, keeping other things 
constant. Managers’ incentives, in such firms, to indulge in opportunistic behavior is greater.  
Given that, different firms are exposed to different degrees of the agency problem, we expect the 
efficiency of bank directors in reducing the earnings management problem should be greater in 
those firms which inherently have a higher level of the agency problem.     This leads to the third 
hypothesis of the study  
 
H3: The negative association between BAD and DA is greater for firms with higher free cash 
flows 
 
The phenomenon of business group affiliation is in response to imperfections in capital and labor 
markets (Khanna and Palepu 2000). The firms in a given business group, connected through 
pyramidal ownership structure, share resources among themselves in order to overcome the 
imperfections of the capital markets. This pyramidal ownership structure creates a wedge 
between controlling and cash flow rights ( Gopalan et al. 2014, Kim and Yi 2006, Singla et al. 
2014). This creates another class of agency conflict that exists between controlling majority 
shareholder and other minority shareholders. The managers in such firms usually represent the 
interest of the controlling shareholder and sharing of resources among group firms necessitates 
managing their earnings (Jian and Wong 2004, Liu and Lu 2007). Therefore, it is important to 
test whether the impact of BAD differs across group and standalone firms. Theoretically, there 
should not be any difference in their impact as the incentives to monitor firm activities stem from 
their responsibility of protecting their parent bank’s interests, which just depends on the 
existence of the agency conflict and not on the type of agency conflict. This argument predicts 
no differential impact of BAD on the earning management of group and standalone firms. 
However, the existence of complex ownership structure, various tunneling mechanisms and 
related party transactions may dent their ability to supervise effectively (Sarkar et al. 2008, 
Chakrabarti et al. 2008).  Which of these arguments holds true is an empirical question that we 
are trying to answer in this study. 
 
H4: The association between BAD and DA is the same for both group as well as standalone 
firms 
 
4 Data and methodology 
 
4.1 Data 
We use the data for firms listed on National Stock Exchange of India (NSE). The data has been 
collected from Prowess database, maintained by Center for Monitoring Indian Economy which 
provides firm level financial and corporate governance information of the Indian firms. We use 
this designation of the director, provided in Prowess database, to identify bank appointed 
directors. They are designated as nominee directors and the name of the bank is provided in 
brackets. By following this procedure, we could identify 303 firms which have at least one bank 
appointed director for at least one year during our study period, i.e. from 2005 through 2016. We 
exclude all non-financial firms and firms belonging to the industries which have less than 10 
firms in a given year from our sample (Abdul et al., 2006; Sarkar et al., 2008). In total, our 
sample has 12558 firm year observations for 1278 unique firms covering the time span from 
2005 through 2016. Out of this, 1616 firm year observations belonging to 303 unique firms have 
bank appointed directors. The summary statistics for full sample firms, firms with no bank 
appointed directors and firms with bank appointed directors are presented in Table 1. We 
winsorize all the firm level factors at 1% level.   
Table 1 Here 
 
The average DA for our sample firms is about 8.1%, which is higher than 1.5% reported by 
Dayanandan and Sra (2016) and 5.6%  reported by Mishra and Malhotra (2016) for Indian firms 
(This could be due to the difference in reference sample).    However, this value is much higher 
for no bank director firms (8.5%) compared to that of firms with bank directors (6.7%). The 
difference is found to be statistically significant at 1% as tested using the t-statistic. The 
magnitude of the difference, i.e. 1.5% is economically significant too, it implies that firms 
without any bank directors manipulate their earnings more by almost 22.5% compared to that of 
firms with bank directors. The firms with bank director are characterized with lower 
performance, growth and free cash flows and higher size, tangibility and leverage. 
4.2 Methodology 
We use the discretionary accruals approach to examine the impact of bank appointed directors on 
earnings management. Bank directors, by virtue of being experts in accounting techniques and 
having access to checking accounts of the firms, should be able to detect any manipulative 
attempt of the manager’s  in earnings reporting. 
4.2.1 Discretionary accruals 
The literature defines earnings management by comparing the stated total accruals in their 
financial statements with that of estimated accruals from their activities. Any difference between 
these two would be taken as an attempt to manage their earnings.  Therefore, the absolute 
difference between these two is considered as an evidence for the existence of earnings 
management by the firms in the accounting literature (Jones 1991, Dechow et al. 1995, Cohen 
and Zarowin 2010). We use widely accepted Dechow et al. (1995) version of the Jones (1991) 
model to estimate the discretionary accruals.  This model involves two steps. In the first step, the 
actual accruals reported by the firm are calculated from the financial statements of the firms. 
Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014) use Eq. (1) to calculate the reported accruals
9
 
 
   it it it it it itTA  CA Cash  –  CL  Short _ Term _ Debt  –  Dep             (1) 
 
Where, 
 
TA is Total Accrual, ΔCA is the change in current assets, ΔCash is the change in cash holdings, 
ΔCL is the change in current liabilities, ΔShort_Term_Debt is the change in the proportion of 
long term loan included in the current liabilities and Dep is the depreciation expenditure. In the 
prowess database, current liabilities do not include the current portion of the long term debt and 
hence, we do not consider ΔShort_Term_Debtit  while calculating TA, the modified formulae is 
given in Eq. (2) 
                       
it it it it itTA  CA Cash  – CL  –  Dep                (2) 
 
The second step involves estimating the non-discretionary accruals from firm activities. Again, 
there are two sub steps in this. In the first step, we regress Total accruals from Eq. (2) on 
Delta_sales and PPE, all are scaled by lagged values of total assets
10
.  
it it it
1 2 3 it
it 1 it 1 it 1
TA sales PPE
Assets Assets Assets  
   
        
   
                                                           (4)                                                 
The coefficients of the Eq. (4) are estimated for each industry and year. As suggested by Jones 
(1991), we consider only those industries for which at least 10 firms are present in our dataset for 
any given year. We follow two digit NIC (National Industrial Classification) system of the 
prowess
11
.  
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 Cohen and Zarowin (2010) use slightly a modified version to calculate TA, they use 
 
TAit = EFOit-OCFit             (3) 
Where, TAit  is the reported total accruals  of i
th
 firm in year ‘t’, EFO is earnings from operating activities and OCF 
is operating cash flows. We estimated TA from both the procedures, however, the choice of methods did not make 
any difference to our results and thus, we use Eq (2) only in this study. 
10
 Scaling is done in order to reduce the heteroskedasticity problem (Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca 2014) 
11
 Our industry classification is very similar to two digit SIC classification of the US system 
 Firms could alter sales figure by altering the credit terms, therefore, there is a need to adjust our 
sales for changes in receivables (Dechow et al.1995), Hence, we subtract changes in receivables 
from that of changes in sales. After this adjustment, we have Eq. (5) to estimate non-
discretionary accruals 
 it it it
it 1 2 3 it
it 1 it 1
sales receivables PPE
ND _ Accruals
Assets Assets 
   
        
 
                         (5)           
Where,  
ά1,  ά2, and  ά3 are the estimated coefficients from Eq. (4).  Finally, the discretionary accruals are 
estimated as the difference between the reported accruals and non-discretionary Accruals 
 
it it itDis _ Accruals TA ND _ Accruals                                                                                (6) 
4.3 Bank directors and earnings management 
To examine the impact of bank appointed directors on the earnings management, we use 
multivariate regression approach. The baseline model for testing our hypotheses is presented in 
Eq. (7) 
 
 it i t 1 it i it itDis _ Accruals BAD _ Dummy X                                                    (7) 
 
Where,  
 
Dis_Accrualsit is the dependent variable which is estimated from Eq. (6). Our main independent 
variable is the BAD_Dummy, which  is a dummy variable assuming value one if bank appointed 
director is on the board of the firm for that year and otherwise zero, Xit is the vectors of firm 
level control variables. By following the literature (McNichols 2000, Kothari et al. 2005, 
Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca 2014 ), we control for the effects of firm size (log of firm sales), 
performance (ROA, i.e. operating profit as a proportion of total sales), growth (annual change in 
firm sales as a proportion of last year sales), tangibility (the ratio of net fixed assets to total 
assets) and firm leverage (the ratio of total debt  to total assets). Apart from these, we also 
control for the effects of other corporate governance variables which might affect the results of 
our analysis (Marra et al. 2011). They are, auditor quality, which is a dummy variable taking 
value one if the auditors are one among the big 4, otherwise zero. The second is the board size, 
which is the total number of members on the board and lastly board independence, which in the 
proportion of independent director on the board of our sample firms.  
4.4 Estimation 
The choice of the estimator is determined mainly by the structure of the data we use in our 
analysis. Our data consists of an unbalance panel of 1278 firms with 12558 firm year 
observations. This allows us to use both the fixed effects estimator and random effects estimator 
to estimate the coefficients of Eq. (7). However, our main independent variable, BAD_Dummy, 
is a binary variable and thus constrains us from using the fixed effects estimator. Therefore, we 
use the pooled OLS and Random effects estimators (GLS) to estimate the coefficients. The GLS 
estimator, which assumes zero correlation between the independent variables and the error term, 
i.e. no time invariant fixed effects, is used by Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014) to examine the 
impact of corporate governance on the earnings management in latin american countries. In all 
the models, the year and industry effects on earnings management are controlled by using year 
and industry dummies. One specific concern with these two estimators is that they do not 
account for the effects of time invariant factors affecting the estimation. However, in the later 
part of this paper, we compare the average discretionary accruals of the same set of firms in their 
Pre-BAD and BAD period using the differences in difference approach. This helps in controlling 
for the firm level time invariant factors as we compare the discretionary accruals of the same 
firms in two different time periods
12
. The results from this analysis support the findings of 
pooled OLS and random effects estimators. Therefore, the choice of the estimator does not make 
any difference to our results. 
5 Results and discussions 
 
5.1 Discretionary accruals and bank appointed directors 
The governing effect of BAD through effective monitoring, aided by their access to information 
and expertise to understand the information, is hypothesized to have a negative impact on the 
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 Fixed effects being time invariant do not change over time period of the same firms 
opportunistic behavior of managers in managing earnings. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Model I thorough Model III report the results of the pooled OLS estimator and others (Model IV, 
V & VI), the random effects GLS estimator. In the univariate analysis (Models I and IV), the 
coefficient of BAD_Dummy variable is negative and significant at 0.01 level, supporting the 
hypothesized relationship between BAD and DA as in H1. However, these results could be 
affected by other firm level factors, therefore, in Models II and V we include firm level control 
variables along with year and industry dummies. Even in these models, the coefficient of 
BAD_Dummy is negative and significant, confirming the results of the univariate analysis. 
Lastly, we include board size and board independence into our model to control for the impact of 
other governance machanisms on DA and reestimate the coefficients. The coefficient of 
BAD_Dummy remains the same even in this analysis. Therefore, the results are robust even 
when we are controlling for firm level factors, corporate governance structure, year effects and 
industry effects. The results from these analyses imply that the average DA of BAD firms is 
significantly lower than that of non-BAD firms, therefore, providing a strong supporting 
evidence for the argument that BAD would have a negative impact on the DA. 
 
Among the control variables, consistent with the previous findings (Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca 
2014),  firm size and tangibility have negative coefficients, and  growth and leverage have  
positive coefficients.  Firm performance (ROA) has a negative coefficient which contradicts the 
findings of Kothari et al. (2005). Among the corporate governance variables, board size and 
board independence have negative and significant coefficients which are not only consistent 
across models but also consistent with the previous literature. However, the coefficient of 
Auditor_Dummy has a positive and significant coefficient in some of the models, which is 
contrary to what the theory predicts, but this result is not consistent throughout our study in 
different models.  
Table 2 Here 
 
5.1.1 Pre post analysis 
Our analysis till now has exploited mainly the cross sectional variation in our sample firms to 
examine the impact of BAD on earnings management. There are 303 firms in our sample which 
have  BAD  at least in one year of our study period. Of these, 191 firms have at least two years  
during which there was no BAD on their board. This allow us to exploit time variation in BAD 
to examine its impact on earnings management. For these 191 firms, BAD_Dummy assume 
value one for those years when BAD are there on their board (BAD period) and zero for those 
years when BAD are not there on their board (Pre-BAD period). The coefficient of this dummy 
variable compares the average DA of the same set of firms during the BAD and Pre-BAD 
period.This procedure helps in overcoming the limitation imposed on our analysis by the binary 
nature of the BAD_Dummy variable as we are able to control for the effect of time invariant firm 
level factors affecting our results.  The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
In the univariate analysis, the coefficient of BAD_Dummy is negative and significant at 5% level 
implying a negative impact of DA in the BAD period. The result remains the same even in 
Models II and III, where firm level factors, corporate governance variables and time and industry 
dummies are present. The same results are observed even in all the models of GLS, i.e. Model IV 
through VI. These results provide more robust evidence for the negative impact of  BAD on the 
earnings management of the firms.  
Table 3 Here 
5.1.2 Industry analysis 
In this section, we compare the discretionary accruals of our 191 firms vis-à-vis their industry 
averages in Pre- BAD and BAD periods. We first compute yearly industry average DA and then 
we subtract this industry average from the firm DA to get industry adjusted DA. A positive sign 
on this difference implies that our sample firms have a higher level of DA as compared to their 
industry averages and a negative sign implies the contrary. This procedure has two main 
advantages. First, it controls for the industry wide movements in earnings management and 
second, it provides a reference point to compare DA values. The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
The average DA for our sample firms for the Pre- BAD period is 8.06% and that of industry is 
about 7.5%. This implies that in the Pre- BAD period, our sample firms have a higher level of 
DA as compared to that of their industry peers. In the BAD period, the DA for our sample firms 
has decreased to 7.19% reflecting a decrease of about 0.87%. However, the industry average DA 
has increased by 0.23% in the same period. For the Pre- BAD period, the net impact, i.e. Firm 
DA minus Industry DA,  is positive 0.55% which has turned  to negative 0.53% in the post 
period, the total change being -1.07%. These figures clearly reflect the impact of BAD on 
earnings management. The firms which were having a greater DA, in the Pre- BAD period, have 
a lower DA in the BAD period.  
Table 4 Here 
 
The same result is verified using a regression analysis in Table 5. We regress industry adjusted 
DA on BAD_Dummy along with other control variables. The BAD coefficient is negative and 
significant in all the models, confirming our conclusions drawn earlier. 
 
Table 5 Here 
 
However, these industry results could also indicate an existence of reverse causality. Ex ante, 
there is probability that banks may choose to appoint a director on the board of such firms which 
are into earnings management. Once appointed, they bring  down the level of management. If 
this is so, then it creates endogeneity issue which might affect the robustness of our results. In 
the following section, we try to account for such endogeneity in our analyses. 
5.2 Information asymmetry and bank appointed directors 
In hypothesis H2, we argue that the negative impact of BAD on DA should be greater for small 
firms on account of their exposure to a higher extent of information asymmetry. To examine this 
aspect, we divide our sample firms to small and large firms based on the median value of firm 
size. The firms with greater than median size are the large firms. We then, re estimate our 
regression coefficients separately for these two groups. The results are presented in Models I, II 
and Models IV and V in Table 6. In all these Models, the BAD_Dummy coefficient is negative 
and significant, implying the stable nature of the impact irrespective of information asymmetry.  
 
However, to understand whether there is a significant differential impact on small firms, we  
create a dummy variable taking value one if the firm is large and zero otherwise.  This size 
dummy is intereacted with BAD dummy to get a differential intercept for large firms. If the 
negative impact is greater for small firms, then the interaction coefficient should be positive and 
significant. This is what exactly we observe in Models III and VI. The statistical significance of 
the coefficient in Model III is a little weak, i.e. at 10%. Hence, to provide more robust evidence 
on the information asymmetry effect, we use firm growth as an another proxy to measure 
information asymmetry. Growth firms have a greater uncertainty about their cash flows, growth 
strategies, financing and investment expenditures. This creates information asymmetry between 
inside managers and outside investors (Barclay and Smith 1995, Byrd and Mizruchi 2005), thus 
allowing managers to indulge in opportunistic behavior in managing earnings. Therefore, in this 
case, we expect that the negative impact should be greater for growth firms. 
 
Table 6 Here 
 
To examine this, we follow the same strategy of dividing our sample firms into low and high 
growth firms based on the median value of growth and testing the hypothesis individually as well 
as in interaction method. The results are presented in Table 4. For low growth firms, in models I, 
IV and VI, the BAD coefficient is not statistically significant from zero and in model II it is 
weakly significant. These results suggest that, the BAD do not have any impact on the earnings 
management of low informationally asymmetric firms, i.e. low growth firms. A completely 
opposite result is observed for high growth firms, in all the analyses, the BAD coefficient, 
including the interaction term in models III and VI,  is strongly significant and negative. This 
result provides a strong supporting evidence to the hypothesis that BAD have a greater negative 
impact on the discretionary accruals of the informationally asymmetric firms. 
 
Table 7 Here 
5.3 Free cash flows and bank appointed directors 
In H3, we hypothesized that the negative impact of BAD should be greater for firms with a 
higher exposure to the free cash flow agency problem. To examine this aspect, we divide our 
sample firms into low and high cash flow firms based on the median value of free cash flows
13
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 Calculated as  the ratio of (Operating profit-interest expenses-tax-dividend paid+ depreciation) to total assets 
The firms with above median cash flows are the firms which are exposed to a greater degree of 
the agency problem and for these firms, we expect the BAD to have a greater negative impact. 
The results are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8 Here 
 
We continue our previous approach of re-estimating the coefficients separately for low and high 
free cash flow firms and then testing the difference of the coefficients through an interaction 
dummy variable. For Low_FCF firms, the BAD_Dummy coefficient is not significant in all the 
Models expect in Model I where, it is significant at 10% level, however, for High_FCF firms the 
coefficients are significant in all the models, including the interaction coefficients. This clearly 
implies that the negative impact of bank directors that we observe in Table 2 is flowing mainly 
from high free cash flow firms, i.e. firms which are exposed to a greater agency problem.  
5.4 Affiliation to business groups and bank appointed directors 
Next, we examine whether the impact differs across firms categorized into two groups based on 
their affiliation to business groups. The argument that the effeiciency of BAD depends on the 
existence of agency costs and not on the type of agency costs predict a no differential impact of 
BAD on group firms. However, the existence of complex ownership structures and tunneling 
mechanisms may decrease their ability to supervise firm activities more efficiently suggesting a 
lesser impact. To examine which of these arguments hold true for our sample firms, we create a 
group dummy taking value one if the firm is affiliated to any business group, otherwise zero. The 
results are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9 Here 
 
There are some interesting results. First, the coefficient of Group_Dum in Model III and VI is 
negative and significant, implying a lower level of earnings management in group affiliated firms 
as compared to that of  standalone firms. Second, the coefficient of BAD_Dummy for group 
firms in Model II is weakly significant at 10% and in Model V it is not significant. Third, the 
coefficient of BAD_Dummy for standalone firms is significant in all the models and lastly, the 
interaction coefficient in Model III and VI is not significant. These results seem to suggest that 
BAD are not as effective in controlling the earning management of the group affiliated firms as 
they are in standalone firms. However,further research is needed before we conclude about the 
impact of ownership structure, tunneling mechanisms and related party transactions on the 
effectiveness of BAD in controlling earnings management of group firms.   
6 Robustness: Endogeneity tests 
Table 4 shows that there is a possibility that banks might appoint their directors based on the ex-
ante earnings management of the firms. The probability of appointing a director increases with 
higher levels of earnings management. In order to account for this issue, we use IV-2SLS 
approach. 
Finding exogenous instrumental variables which are not correlated with the earnings 
management (DA) is not easy. Most of the firm level variables are correlated with DA. However, 
we use two instruments for bank directors. First, lag value of earnings management, banks 
choose to appoint directors based on the ex ante level of DA. The current level of DA depends 
on the current aspects of the governing mechanisms and not on the previous level of DA. This 
makes one year lag values of DA as a suitable instrumental variable for the appointment of bank 
director. The second instrumental variable we use is the amount of bank debt in terms of total 
assets. Higher is the proportion of bank debt the higher is the probability of appointing a director. 
This is to be noted here that decision to appoint a bank director is taken ex ante and then loan is 
disbursed. Therefore, appointment of BAD depends on the current level of DA and the amount 
of bank loan to be financed
14
 as the instrumental variables for BAD_Dummy. For the base model 
mentioned in Eq. (7), our data rejected the null of the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, i.e. the 
instruments are weak, with a probability of <0.001 and failed to reject the null of Hansen J with a 
probability of 0.39. These two tests show that our instruments are relevant as well as valid.  
 
The results of the second stage of 2SLS of our baseline model are presented in Table 10. In all 
the models, the coefficient of BAD_Dummy is negative and significant. In unreported analyses, 
we test all other hypotheses using this IV-2SLS approach, and the results remained qualitatively 
the same, as presented in previous tables, except for the cash flow analysis. Where, the 
interaction term was not statistically significant. Thus, most of the findings of this study are 
robust even after accounting for the endogeneity issue. 
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 We use the current level of Bank debt as a ratio of total assets to measure this 
Table 10 Here 
 
7 Conclusions 
This is the first study, which examines the governing role of the debt holders on the earnings 
management of the Indian firms. We show that firms with BADs have significantly lesser DA as 
compared to that of firms without BADs and these results remain robust even after controlling 
for the effect of  traditional corporate governance variables which proxy shareholder governance. 
This highlights the importance of corporate governance mechanisms available for debt holders in 
shaping up various financial and reporting policies of the firms, which hitherto has been ignored 
in the literature. Our results have some important questions for the future research. Such as, what 
are the implications of governance of debt holders on firm value, financial policy and other 
strategic decisions? Does this impact is influenced by the legal and institutional framework of the 
study? Also, it is interesting to examine the impact of organizational culture on the effectiveness 
of the debtholder’s governance.  
 
Our study has some important implications for the policy makers. Our results have to be seen in 
the larger context of ongoing reforms in the corporate governance regulations throughout the 
world. Most of these regulations, aim at improving the governance of firms from the 
shareholders perspective, our results show that considering debt holders in the larger scheme of 
governance could yield better results than considering shareholders alone. Policies like, making 
it compulsory to have a director from among the debtholders could go a long way in solving the 
corporate governance issues of corporate firms.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
DA is discretionary accruals which is calculated by using Eq. (6), Size is the natural log of firm sales, ROA is return 
on assets which is the ratio of operating profit to total assets, Tangibility is the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets, 
Growth is the annual growth rate in firm sales, FCF is the free cash flow ratio which is calculated as (operating 
profit- interest expenses-tax-dividends+ depreciation) as a proportion of total assets and Lev is the ratio of total debt 
to total assets. The significance of the difference is tested by t-statistic. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively 
Variable Full Sample No Bank director firms Bank director firms Difference 
  N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD   
DA 11013 0.081 0.092 9627 0.083 0.095 1386 0.067 0.073 -0.015*** 
Size 12116 8.241 1.871 10504 8.152 1.903 1612 8.824 1.524 0.673*** 
ROA 12200 0.108 0.118 10586 0.110 0.123 1614 0.098 0.079 -0.012*** 
Tangibility 12166 0.30 0.19 10552 0.28 0.17 1614 0.40 0.17 0.12*** 
Growth 10360 0.17 0.30 9039 0.18 0.34 1321 0.16 0.30 -0.02** 
FCF 12196 0.097 0.094 10582 0.099 0.095 1614 0.088 0.088 -0.011*** 
Lev 11153 0.315 0.195 9643 0.298 0.191 1510 0.422 0.185 0.124*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Bank appointed directors and earnings management 
Dependent variable: Discretionary_accruals calculated from Eq. (6). Independent variables: BAD_Dummy is a 
dummy variable which takes value one if the firm has bank appointed director otherwise zero, Size is the natural log 
of firm sales, ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets, Tangibility is the ratio of net fixed assets to total 
assets, Growth is the annual growth rate in sales,  Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets, Auditor_Dummy is a 
dummy variable which takes value one if the auditor is one among  the big 4, otherwise zero, Board_size is the total 
number of  members present on the board and Board_Ind is the proportion of independent directors on the board.  
The t-values calculate using heteroscedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, ** 
and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
  Pooled_OLS Pooled_OLS Pooled_OLS GLS GLS GLS 
BAD_Dummy -0.015*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 
(-7.011) (-4.357) (-3.698) (-4.845) (-3.573) (-3.214) 
Size 
 
-0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
-0.005*** -0.005*** 
  
(-7.183) (-5.787) 
 
(-5.692) (-5.182) 
ROA 
 
-0.014* -0.015* 
 
-0.017* -0.017* 
  
(-1.831) (-1.942) 
 
(-1.884) (-1.911) 
Tangibility 
 
-0.057*** -0.055*** 
 
-0.054*** -0.053*** 
  
(-9.011) (-8.786) 
 
(-6.757) (-6.642) 
Growth 
 
0.038*** 0.037*** 
 
0.035*** 0.035*** 
  
(8.188) (8.014) 
 
(7.453) (7.382) 
Lev 
 
0.042*** 0.041*** 
 
0.035*** 0.035*** 
  
(7.511) (7.197) 
 
(5.110) (4.993) 
Auditor_Dummy 
  
0.006* 
  
0.008* 
   
(1.821) 
  
(1.780) 
Board_size 
  
-0.001* 
  
-0.000 
   
(-1.835) 
  
(-0.611) 
Board_Ind 
  
-0.026*** 
  
-0.024*** 
   
(-4.196) 
  
(-3.034) 
Constant 0.083*** 0.131*** 0.152*** 0.083*** 0.140*** 0.158*** 
 
(85.875) (16.324) (16.451) (61.676) (13.593) (13.630) 
Observations 11,013 9,478 9,478 11,013 9,478 9,478 
R
2
 0.003 0.117 0.120 0.003 0.116 0.118 
Year Effects NO Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
Ind Effects NO Yes Yes NO Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Pre-Post analysis 
Dependent variable: Discretionary_accruals calculated from Eq. (6). Independent variables: BAD_Dummy is a 
dummy variable which takes value one for the bank director period otherwise zero,  Size is the natural log of firm 
sales, ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets, Tangibility is the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets, 
Growth is the annual growth rate in sales,  Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets, Auditor_Dummy is a dummy 
variable which takes value one if the auditor is one among  the big 4, otherwise zero, Board_size is the total number 
of  members present on the board and Board_Ind is the proportion of independent directors on the board.  The t-
values calculate using heteroscedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
  Pooled_OLS Pooled_OLS Pooled_OLS GLS GLS GLS 
BAD_Dummy -0.009** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.007* -0.009** -0.011** 
 
(-2.265) (-2.702) (-2.782) (-1.693) (-2.075) (-2.345) 
Size 
 
-0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
-0.008*** -0.009*** 
  
(-4.428) (-4.352) 
 
(-3.516) (-3.836) 
ROA 
 
-0.031 -0.029 
 
-0.014 -0.014 
  
(-0.946) (-0.860) 
 
(-0.411) (-0.396) 
Tangibility 
 
-0.053*** -0.053*** 
 
-0.052*** -0.054*** 
  
(-3.854) (-3.873) 
 
(-3.508) (-3.623) 
Growth 
 
0.044*** 0.045*** 
 
0.041*** 0.042*** 
  
(4.314) (4.372) 
 
(3.876) (3.924) 
Lev 
 
0.046*** 0.048*** 
 
0.038** 0.041*** 
  
(3.752) (3.704) 
 
(2.439) (2.582) 
Auditor_Dummy 
  
-0.006 
  
-0.006 
   
(-0.923) 
  
(-0.899) 
Board_size 
  
-0.000 
  
0.001 
   
(-0.214) 
  
(0.679) 
Board_Ind 
  
0.044*** 
  
0.040** 
   
(2.984) 
  
(2.475) 
Constant 0.081*** 0.142*** 0.112*** 0.080*** 0.146*** 0.117*** 
 
(27.892) (7.218) (5.079) (21.700) (5.651) (4.293) 
Observations 1,894 1,665 1,665 1,894 1,665 1,665 
R
2
 0.003 0.144 0.150 0.003 0.143 0.148 
Year Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Ind Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Industry adjusted analysis 
Variables Avg_DA Ind_Avg_DA Difference 
Pre -Period 0.0806 0.0750 0.0055*** 
BAD_Period 0.0719 0.0773 -0.0053*** 
Difference -0.0087*** 0.0023** -0.0107*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Industry adjusted analysis 
Dependent variable: Industry adjusted Discretionary_accruals is the difference between discretionary accruals 
calculated from Eq. (6) and the industry average discretionary accruals. Independent variables: BAD_Dummy is a 
dummy variable which takes value one for the bank director period otherwise zero,  Size is the natural log of firm 
sales, ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets, Tangibility is the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets, 
Growth is the annual growth rate in sales,  Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets, Auditor_Dummy is a dummy 
variable which takes value one if the auditor is one among  the big 4, otherwise zero, Board_size is the total number 
of  members present on the board and Board_Ind is the proportion of independent directors on the board.  The t-
values calculate using heteroscedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Ind_Adj_DAC Pooled_OLS Pooled_OLS GLS GLS 
BAD_Dummy -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010** -0.010** 
 
(-2.910) (-3.015) (-2.349) (-2.344) 
Size 
 
-0.006*** 
 
-0.007*** 
  
(-3.792) 
 
(-3.527) 
ROA 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.012 
  
(-0.819) 
 
(-0.347) 
Growth 
 
0.037*** 
 
0.034*** 
  
(3.871) 
 
(3.415) 
Tangibility 
 
-0.044*** 
 
-0.047*** 
  
(-3.878) 
 
(-3.649) 
Lev 
 
0.048*** 
 
0.038*** 
  
(4.300) 
 
(2.711) 
Auditor_Dummy 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.010 
  
(-1.451) 
 
(-1.599) 
Board_size 
 
-0.000 
 
0.001 
  
(-0.347) 
 
(0.812) 
Board_Ind 
 
0.028** 
 
0.027* 
  
(1.985) 
 
(1.653) 
Constant 0.005** 0.020 0.005 0.032 
 
(2.004) (1.125) (1.510) (1.283) 
Observations 1,894 1,665 1,894 1,665 
R
2
 0.004 0.066 0.004 0.067 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 : Information asymmetry; the firm size effect 
Dependent variable: Discretionary_accruals calculated from Eq. (6). Independent variables: BAD_Dummy is a 
dummy variable which takes value one if the firm has bank appointed director otherwise zero, ROA is the ratio of 
operating income to total assets, Tangibility is the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets, Growth is the annual 
growth rate in sales,  Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets, Auditor_Dummy is a dummy variable which takes 
value one if the auditor is one among  the big 4, otherwise zero,  Size_Dum is a dummy variable which takes value 
one for firms with above median size otherwise zero, Size_Bad_Dum is an interaction variable between Size_dum 
and Bad_Dummy, Board_size is the total number of  members present on the board and Board_Ind is the proportion 
of independent directors on the board.  The t-values calculate using heteroscedasticity adjusted robust standard 
errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
 Small Large Full sample Small Large Full sample 
  Pooled_OLS Pooled_OLS Pooled_OLS GLS GLS GLS 
BAD_Dummy -0.013*** -0.006** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.005* -0.017*** 
 
(-3.226) (-2.068) (-3.643) (-3.390) (-1.831) (-3.833) 
ROA -0.013 -0.017*** -0.017** -0.001 -0.017*** -0.019** 
 
(-0.416) (-3.568) (-2.209) (-0.018) (-3.414) (-2.270) 
Tangibility -0.057*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.060*** -0.050*** -0.051*** 
 
(-5.718) (-6.842) (-8.533) (-4.893) (-5.503) (-6.401) 
Growth 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
 
(5.722) (5.271) (7.885) (4.762) (4.936) (7.233) 
Lev 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.043*** 0.035*** 
 
(4.397) (6.107) (7.169) (3.221) (5.333) (5.009) 
Size_Dum 
  
-0.012*** 
  
-0.013*** 
   
(-5.572) 
  
(-5.347) 
Size_Bad_Dum 
  
0.007* 
  
0.012** 
   
(1.691) 
  
(2.336) 
Auditor_Dummy 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 
(0.421) (1.589) (1.532) (0.523) (1.638) (1.541) 
Board_size -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001** -0.001* 
 
(-1.684) (-3.043) (-3.152) (-0.495) (-2.329) (-1.688) 
Board_Ind -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.024** -0.024*** -0.023*** 
 
(-2.947) (-3.122) (-4.045) (-1.968) (-2.668) (-2.912) 
Constant 0.130*** 0.111*** 0.126*** 0.130*** 0.109*** 0.127*** 
 
(10.287) (9.573) (15.271) (8.534) (8.504) (13.397) 
Observations 4,340 5,138 9,478 4,340 5,138 9,478 
R
2
 0.102 0.139 0.119 0.099 0.138 0.118 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Information asymmetry; the growth effect 
Dependent variable: Discretionary_accruals calculated from Eq. (6). Independent variables: BAD_Dummy is a 
dummy variable which takes value one if the firm has bank appointed director otherwise zero, ROA is the ratio of 
operating income to total assets, Tangibility is the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets,  Lev is the ratio of total debt 
to total assets, Auditor_Dummy is a dummy variable which takes value one if the auditor is one among  the big 4, 
otherwise zero,  Growth_Dum is a dummy variable which takes value one for firms with above median growth 
otherwise zero,   Growth_Bad_Dum is an interaction variable between Growth_dum and Bad_Dummy,   Board_size 
is the total number of  members present on the board and Board_Ind is the proportion of independent directors on 
the board.  The t-values calculate using heteroscedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are presented in 
parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
VARIABLES Model I   Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
 L_Growth H_Growth Full_Sample L_Growth H_Growth Full_Sample 
  Pooled_OLS Pooled_OLS Pooled_OLS GLS GLS GLS 
BAD_Dummy -0.006* -0.013*** -0.002 -0.006 -0.013*** -0.004 
 
(-1.818) (-4.216) (-0.744) (-1.583) (-3.822) (-1.059) 
Size -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 
(-2.901) (-4.882) (-5.680) (-2.487) (-4.448) (-4.401) 
ROA -0.054** 0.012 0.000 -0.054* 0.008 -0.003 
 
(-2.013) (0.725) (0.029) (-1.681) (0.459) (-0.228) 
Tangibility -0.037*** -0.086*** -0.063*** -0.035*** -0.085*** -0.061*** 
 
(-4.135) (-9.448) (-10.136) (-3.068) (-9.222) (-7.941) 
Lev 0.043*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 
 
(5.505) (4.386) (7.423) (4.526) (3.624) (5.453) 
Growth_Dum 
  
0.013*** 
  
0.012*** 
   
(6.749) 
  
(6.384) 
Growth_BAD_Dum 
  
-0.013*** 
  
-0.011** 
   
(-3.051) 
  
(-2.541) 
Auditor_Dummy 0.009* 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.001 0.007 
 
(1.800) (0.069) (1.559) (1.567) (0.242) (1.458) 
Board_size -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001** 
 
(-3.422) (-1.178) (-3.088) (-2.765) (-0.727) (-2.106) 
Board_Ind -0.021** -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.017* -0.035*** -0.028*** 
 
(-2.383) (-4.184) (-4.946) (-1.723) (-3.471) (-3.674) 
Constant 0.119*** 0.216*** 0.164*** 0.119*** 0.216*** 0.167*** 
 
(9.634) (15.360) (17.527) (8.596) (14.408) (14.491) 
Observations 4,745 5,346 10,091 4,745 5,346 10,091 
R
2
 0.098 0.123 0.109 1,150 1,214 1,242 
Year Effets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind Effets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: The free cash flow effect 
Dependent variable: Discretionary_accruals calculated from Eq. (6). Independent variables: BAD_Dummy is a 
dummy variable which takes value one if the firm has bank appointed director otherwise zero,  Size is the natural log 
of firm sales, ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets, Tangibility is the ratio of net fixed assets to total 
assets, Growth is the annual growth rate in sales,  Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets, FCF_Dum is a dummy 
variable which takes value one if a firm has greater than median free cash flows otherwise zero(We divide our 
sample firms into low and high free cash flow (FCF) based on the median value of free cash flows, which is 
calculated as (Operating profit-interest expenses-dividend paid + depreciation)/ Total assets), FCF_BAD_Dum is an 
interaction variable between FCF_Dum and BAD_Dum,  Auditor_Dummy is a dummy variable which takes value 
one if the auditor is one among  the big 4, otherwise zero,  Board_size is the total number of  members present on 
the board and Board_Ind is the proportion of independent directors on the board.  The t-values calculate using 
heteroscedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
VARIABLES Model I   Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
 Low_FCF High_FCF Full_Sample Low_FCF High_FCF Full_Sample 
  Pooled_OLS 
Pooled_OL
S Pooled_OLS GLS GLS GLS 
BAD_Dummy -0.007* -0.010*** -0.001 -0.007 -0.011*** -0.002 
 
(-1.809) (-3.992) (-0.340) (-1.602) (-3.496) (-0.458) 
Size -0.002* -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.002 -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 
(-1.729) (-6.307) (-5.753) (-1.358) (-6.223) (-5.194) 
ROA -0.285*** 0.007 -0.016** -0.285*** 0.002 -0.019** 
 
(-6.076) (0.338) (-2.061) (-4.537) (0.141) (-2.191) 
Tangibility -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.054*** 
 
(-6.136) (-6.627) (-8.729) (-5.110) (-4.767) (-6.676) 
Growth 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.035*** 
 
(5.256) (7.377) (7.926) (5.224) (6.640) (7.329) 
Lev 0.055*** 0.016* 0.040*** 0.055*** 0.010 0.035*** 
 
(6.498) (1.935) (6.908) (5.712) (1.058) (4.844) 
FCF_Dum 
  
0.002 
  
0.003 
   
(0.990) 
  
(1.293) 
FCF_Bad_Dum 
  
-0.014*** 
  
-0.014*** 
   
(-3.400) 
  
(-3.109) 
Auditor_Dummy 0.005 0.005 0.006* 0.005 0.007* 0.008* 
 
(0.883) (1.343) (1.772) (0.683) (1.693) (1.755) 
Board_size -0.001* -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 
(-1.700) (-0.910) (-1.874) (-1.505) (0.115) (-0.645) 
Board_Ind -0.032*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.019** -0.024*** 
 
(-3.380) (-2.710) (-4.195) (-2.829) (-1.978) (-3.024) 
Constant 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.151*** 0.159*** 0.165*** 0.158*** 
 
(10.878) (13.026) (16.364) (9.993) (11.390) (13.569) 
Observations 4,677 4,801 9,478 4,677 4,801 9,478 
R
2
 0.126 0.163 0.120 0.126 0.156 0.120 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: The group affiliation effect 
Dependent variable: Discretionary_accruals calculated from Eq. (6). Independent variables: BAD_Dummy is a 
dummy variable which takes value one if the firm has bank appointed director otherwise zero,  Size is the natural log 
of firm sales, ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets, Tangibility is the ratio of net fixed assets to total 
assets, Growth is the annual growth rate in sales,  Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets, Group_Dum is a 
dummy variable which takes value one if a firm is affiliated to a business group otherwise zero, Group_BAD_Dum 
is an interaction variable between Group_Dum and BAD_Dum,  Auditor_Dummy is a dummy variable which takes 
value one if the auditor is one among  the big 4, otherwise zero,  Board_size is the total number of  members present 
on the board and Board_Ind is the proportion of independent directors on the board.  The t-values calculate using 
heteroscedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
VARIABLES Model I   Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
 Standalone Group Full_Sample Standalone Group Full_Sample 
  Pooled_OLS Pooled_OLS Pooled_OLS GLS GLS GLS 
BAD_Dummy -0.014*** -0.005* -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.005 -0.012** 
 
(-3.379) (-1.888) (-2.997) (-2.964) (-1.520) (-2.469) 
Size -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
(-2.997) (-3.341) (-4.720) (-2.779) (-3.023) (-4.310) 
ROA -0.004 -0.070*** -0.017** -0.008 -0.067** -0.019** 
 
(-0.395) (-2.729) (-2.293) (-0.607) (-2.094) (-2.213) 
Tangibility -0.069*** -0.036*** -0.054*** -0.066*** -0.035*** -0.052*** 
 
(-7.413) (-4.027) (-8.649) (-6.117) (-2.960) (-6.546) 
Growth 0.041*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 
 
(6.392) (4.804) (7.919) (5.827) (4.488) (7.301) 
Lev 0.051*** 0.023*** 0.040*** 0.049*** 0.015 0.034*** 
 
(6.152) (2.886) (7.044) (5.150) (1.346) (4.892) 
Group_Dum 
  
-0.006*** 
  
-0.006** 
   
(-2.773) 
  
(-2.298) 
Group_Bad_Dum 
  
0.006 
  
0.006 
   
(1.252) 
  
(0.954) 
Auditor_Dummy -0.001 0.008** 0.007* 0.001 0.009* 0.008* 
 
(-0.184) (2.025) (1.937) (0.178) (1.671) (1.898) 
Board_size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.374) (-1.454) (-1.667) (0.113) (-0.598) (-0.498) 
Board_Ind -0.033*** -0.011 -0.022*** -0.030** -0.012 -0.020** 
 
(-3.291) (-1.290) (-3.362) (-2.476) (-1.050) (-2.509) 
Constant 0.155*** 0.135*** 0.147*** 0.158*** 0.146*** 0.155*** 
 
(10.675) (9.906) (15.537) (9.488) (7.670) (12.821) 
Observations 4,321 5,157 9,478 4,321 5,157 9,478 
R
2
 0.125 0.112 0.120 0.124 0.111 o.119 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: IV-2SLS regression analysis 
Dependent variable: Discretionary_accruals is calculated from Eq. (6) Independent variables: BAD_Dummy is a 
dummy variable which takes value one for the bank director period otherwise zero. This variable is instrumented 
with lag values of discretionary variables and bank debt ratio.  Size is the natural log of firm sales, ROA is the ratio 
of operating income to total assets, Tangibility is the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets, Growth is the annual 
growth rate in sales,  Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets, Auditor_Dummy is a dummy variable which takes 
value one if the auditor is one among  the big 4, otherwise zero, Board_size is the total number of  members present 
on the board and Board_Ind is the proportion of independent directors on the board. The t-values calculate using 
heteroscedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III 
  DA DA DA 
BAD_Dummy -1.420*** -1.468*** -1.573*** 
 
(-3.117) (-3.308) (-2.642) 
Size 0.026** 0.025*** 0.028** 
 
(2.521) (2.658) (2.201) 
ROA -0.070 -0.086 -0.098 
 
(-1.636) (-1.458) (-1.341) 
Tangibility 0.210** 0.202** 0.192* 
 
(2.175) (2.243) (1.920) 
Growth 0.037** -0.004 -0.008 
 
(2.314) (-0.185) (-0.324) 
Lev 0.454*** 0.468*** 0.422*** 
 
(3.405) (3.582) (2.927) 
Auditor_Dummy 0.039 0.042* 0.047* 
 
(1.632) (1.711) (1.687) 
Board_size 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.019** 
 
(2.754) (3.022) (2.500) 
Board_Ind 0.179** 0.189** 0.218** 
 
(2.349) (2.510) (2.158) 
Constant -0.407** -0.334** -0.305* 
 
(-2.247) (-2.173) (-1.682) 
Observations 8,094 8,094 8,094 
R-squared -29.786 -31.219 -34.537 
Year Effects No Yes Yes 
Ind Effects No No Yes 
Hansen J Statistic(Prob) 0.39 0.72 0.39 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic(Prob) 0.003 0.002 0.018 
 
 
